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Adoption of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights created a 
new international norm prohibiting racial discrimination. That anti-discrimination norm had 
been a part of the paper Constitution in the United States since adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, it did not become a part of the living Constitution until the Fourteenth 
Amendment was subjected to the magnetic pull of international human rights law. Adoption 
of the Charter sparked a chain of events culminating in the Supreme Court decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education, which heralded the end of apartheid in the United States. Many 
Americans think that modern anti-discrimination law was a U.S. invention that we exported 
to the rest of the world. In fact, U.S. anti-discrimination law is properly understood as an 




In July 1948, Mr. Sei Fujii paid $200 to purchase land in Los Angeles County. He 
sought to provoke a legal confrontation with the State of California to challenge the validity 
of California’s Alien Land Law. Fujii was a 65-year-old Japanese citizen who had lived in the 
United States since 1903. He was a graduate of the University of Southern California Law 
School and publisher of the Kashu Mainichi, a bilingual Japanese-American newspaper that 
he founded in the 1930s. Fujii hired his long-time friend and law school classmate J. Marion 
Wright to represent him. Shortly after Fujii purchased the land, Wright filed a complaint in 
California Superior Court in Fujii v. California.1 The story of the ensuing legal battle 




In a widely acclaimed book, Professor Samuel Moyn contends that human rights did 
not exert significant influence over socio-legal developments until the 1970s.2 This essay 
shows that he is wrong. The term “apartheid” refers to a system of legally sanctioned racial 
segregation. The United States maintained its own version of apartheid from the post-Civil-
War era until the 1950s or 1960s. Adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 created a new international norm prohibiting racial 
discrimination. That anti-discrimination norm had been a part of the “paper Constitution” in 
the United States since adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. However, the norm 
did not become a part of the “living Constitution” until the Fourteenth Amendment was 
subjected to the magnetic pull of international human rights law. Adoption of the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration sparked a chain of events culminating in the Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which heralded the end of apartheid in the United 
States. 
Part One explains how the advent of international human rights law transformed the 
conduct of international diplomacy. Part Two discusses the Fujii case. Part Three analyses 
the politics of human rights in the United States between 1947 and 1954. Part Four contends 
that the Supreme Court in Brown effectively incorporated the anti-discrimination norm from 
the Charter and the Universal Declaration into the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I. 
Human Rights and International Diplomacy 
 
The United Nations Charter entered into force in October 1945. Articles 55 and 56 
obligated States to take “joint and separate action” to promote “human rights . . . for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”3 Article 13(1) authorized the 
General Assembly to “initiate studies and make recommendations” to promote “the 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”4 The General Assembly 
established the Commission on Human Rights to carry out this mandate. Eleanor Roosevelt 
3 
 
chaired the Commission from its initial meeting in January 1947 until April 1951.5 During its 
first two years, the Commission drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Article 2 states: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour . . . .”6 After the General 
Assembly adopted the UDHR in December 1948, the Commission focused on drafting a 
Covenant on Human Rights. The main purpose of the Covenant was to translate the 
Declaration’s broad principles into binding treaty language that would create international 
legal obligations for States. In February 1952, the General Assembly decided to divide the 
single Covenant into two separate treaties, which became the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).7 As discussed below, many conservatives in the United States 
believed that the Commission’s effort to codify human rights in international treaties posed a 
serious threat to the U.S. constitutional order. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, racial discrimination in the United States was a 
serious liability for the Truman Administration’s conduct of foreign policy. In a letter to the 
Fair Employment Practice Committee, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated: 
[T]he existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has an 
adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. We are reminded over and 
over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that our treatment of various 
minorities leaves much to be desired. . . . Frequently we find it next to impossible 
to formulate a satisfactory answer to our critics in other countries; the gap 
between the things we stand for in principle and the facts of a particular situation 
may be too wide to be bridged. . . .  The Department of State, therefore, has good 
reason to hope for the continued and increased effectiveness of public and private 
efforts to do away with these discriminations.”8 
 
In October 1947, when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) submitted a human rights petition to the United Nations, Attorney General Tom 
Clark told the National Association of Attorneys General “he was humiliated that African 
Americans had to seek redress of their grievances from the UN.”9 In a brief submitted to the 
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Supreme Court in December 1947, the government stated: “The fact that racial restrictive 
covenants are being enforced by instrumentalities of government has become a source of 
serious embarrassment to agencies of the Federal Government in the performance of many 
essential functions, including . . . the conduct of foreign affairs.”10 Other scholars have 
demonstrated that the adverse foreign policy effect of race discrimination was a key factor 
supporting civil rights reform in the United States in the decades after World War II.11 
However, prior accounts have understated the significance of international human rights law 
as a critical factor linking domestic racial discrimination to the conduct of foreign policy. 
Racial discrimination was a fact of life in the United States from the end of 
Reconstruction until World War II.12 During that period, “the gap between the things we 
stand for in principle and the facts of a particular situation,” in Acheson’s words, was as 
wide, if not wider, than the gap that existed after World War II. Nevertheless, racial 
discrimination was not generally a handicap in our relations with other countries before 1945. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, racial discrimination against Chinese 
nationals, for example, was sometimes an irritant in the U.S. relationship with China.13 
Before World War II, though, discrimination against Chinese nationals was a bilateral issue 
with China that did not affect U.S. relationships with other countries. Adoption of the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration signalled a change in the conduct of international 
diplomacy by creating a new international norm that effectively multilateralized the problem 
of racial discrimination. Before 1945, the obligation not to discriminate against Chinese 
nationals was an obligation owed to China. After adoption of the Charter, the obligation not 
to discriminate on the basis of race became an obligation erga omnes: an obligation owed to 
the entire international community.14 This helps explain why racial discrimination in the 
United States became a subject of intense media interest throughout the world in the late 
1940s,15 even though foreign media generally ignored the problem before 1945. 
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My claim is not that the Charter itself caused a change in the conduct of international 
diplomacy. Rather, the decisions to include human rights provisions in the UN Charter and to 
adopt the Universal Declaration manifested a changed attitude about “domestic” racial 
discrimination. Before 1945, diplomats rarely criticized other countries for their treatment of 
racial minorities unless the complaining country shared a national, ethnic, or religious 
affiliation with the persecuted minority. Unspoken rules of diplomatic protocol dictated that a 
country’s treatment of its own racial minorities was a purely domestic matter. Thus, before 
1945, if a European state criticized the United States for its treatment of African-Americans, 
it was a sufficient response to say, “That’s none of your business.” After adoption of the 
Charter, though, that response was no longer sufficient. Adoption of the Charter and the 
UDHR manifested a shared belief that a nation’s treatment of its own minorities had become 
a matter of international concern. By codifying the norm against racial discrimination in 
various international instruments, States converted “domestic” race discrimination into a 
subject of international diplomacy. Human rights law provided an international standard that 
countries could apply to judge the behavior of other countries. The creation of a new, 
international anti-discrimination norm transformed Jim Crow from a domestic matter into a 
foreign policy issue. 
II. 
The Fujii Case 
 
In Fujii v. California, Mr. Sei Fujii, a Japanese national, challenged the validity of 
California’s Alien Land Law.16 The statute did not explicitly target Japanese for 
discriminatory treatment. Instead, the statute barred all non-citizens from owning land in 
California unless they were eligible to become naturalized citizens.17 Federal law, not 
California law, determined who was eligible for naturalization. Under then-existing federal 
law, Japanese were one of the few groups ineligible for citizenship because of their 
nationality. Moreover, of those national groups who were ineligible for citizenship, Japanese 
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were the only group with a sizeable population in California. Therefore, the main practical 
effect of the Alien Land Law was to preclude Japanese from owning land in California. Fujii 
and his attorney, J. Marion Wright, were well aware of these facts; they were determined to 
end California’s longstanding practice of discriminating against Japanese people.   
The trial court upheld the validity of the Alien Land Law and Fujii appealed. Wright’s 
appellate brief contended that the Alien Land Law violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause. From a modern perspective, it seems obvious that a state law barring 
Japanese nationals from owning property violates the Equal Protection Clause. However, it 
was not obvious in 1949. To the contrary, the California Attorney General cited a long string 
of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court upholding the 
validity of the Alien Land Law.18 Thus, in terms of legal precedent, Wright and Fujii faced an 
uphill battle. 
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of his Equal Protection claim, Wright also argued 
that the Alien Land Law conflicted with “the exalted principles and high resolutions of our 
nation as expressed in the United Nations Charter.”19 Two Charter provisions are especially 
relevant for Fujii. Article 55 states: “the United Nations shall promote . . .  universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion.” Under Article 56, Member States “pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action . . . for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.” 
20
 Thus, Articles 55 and 56 obligate the United States to take “separate action” to promote 
“human rights . . . for all without distinction as to race.” But this statement raises several 
questions. Is the right to own property a “human right”? If so, what type of “separate action” 
must the United States take to promote that right? Is a statutory distinction between citizens 
and non-citizens a “distinction as to race” within the meaning of Article 55 if, in practice, the 
statute has a disparate impact on Japanese nationals?  
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Finally, assuming there is an actual conflict between the Alien Land Law and the UN 
Charter, should a California court apply the statute to decide the case, or should it apply the 
Charter? The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause addresses that question. The Clause specifies 
that treaties ratified by the United States are “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”21 Thus, if there is a conflict between a ratified treaty and state 
law, the Supremacy Clause directs “Judges in every State” to apply the treaty. Therefore, if 
Fujii’s equal protection argument failed, the combination of the UN Charter and the 
Supremacy Clause provided an alternative legal rationale for invalidating the Alien Land 
Law. 
The California Court of Appeal issued its decision in April 1950.22 The court easily 
dismissed Wright’s equal protection argument, citing a string of decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court upholding the validity of the Alien Land 
Law. The court concluded that portion of its opinion as follows: 
[T]his opinion might well be terminated under the doctrine of stare decisis 
with a reaffirmation of the former decisions, since upon constitutional 
questions we deem ourselves obliged to follow the decisions of the Supreme 
Courts of the United States and of this State until one of those courts should 
announce the overruling of its own decisions.23 
 
The court then addressed Fujii’s human rights argument. It held that California’s Alien Land 
Law was invalid because California law conflicted with the Charter, and the Supremacy 
Clause required state courts to apply the treaty.24 The court’s decision sent a shock wave 
through the U.S. political system whose effects are still felt today.  
The Court of Appeal issued its decision on April 24, 1950. An article the next day in 
the Los Angeles Times described Fujii as a “precedent-setting decision.”25 The Los Angeles 
Daily Journal, a newspaper written primarily for the legal profession, correctly described 
Fujii as “the first decision in which the Charter of the United Nations has been invoked to 
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invalidate a law of a State.”26 The San Francisco Chronicle and New York Times also 
published short stories about the case. 
On April 28, 1950, four days after the court’s decision, Senator Forrest Donnell, a 
Republican from Missouri, warned his Senate colleagues about the dangers of Fujii. The fact 
that the Senate devoted floor time to a discussion of the Fujii case is extremely unusual. U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions routinely attract the Senate’s attention. The Senate sometimes heeds 
decisions by state supreme courts and lower federal courts. However, Fujii was a decision by 
an intermediate appellate court in California — a state court, not a federal court. Intermediate 
appellate courts throughout the United States issue hundreds or thousands of decisions every 
day. The Senate rarely notices any of them. Even so, the Senate spent approximately one hour 
of its valuable time on April 28, 1950, discussing the implications of Fujii.27  
Senator Donnell read a statement quoting several paragraphs from the Court of 
Appeal’s decision.28 He summarized the case as follows: “Mr. President, the opinion from 
which I have just read holds . . . that a valid treaty, which is, by the Constitution of the United 
States, the supreme law of the land, invalidates the law of a state which is in conflict with 
said treaty.”29 Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI) was not prepared to concede that the court’s 
decision was correct. However, if the decision was correct, he noted, the effect of the Charter 
“may be to nullify or make void all statutes in any State in relation to distinctions made 
between the sexes; and, in addition, we may find that by that means equal rights have already 
been established in the United States.”30 He did need to state explicitly —– because it was 
obvious to everyone present — that the Charter would also invalidate Jim Crow laws 
throughout the South.  
Senator Donnell recalled the 1920 Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Holland.31 
He explained that Holland held that “the adoption of a treaty on a given subject matter which 
is within the treaty power and as to which subject matter there had been no previous grant to 
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Congress of legislative power causes Congress . . . to be possessed of power to legislate to 
carry into effect such treaty.”32 Senator George Malone (R-NV) responded: “If I correctly 
understand the Senator’s interpretation . . . it does open the door to Congress to legislate on 
subjects which were never given by the States through the Constitution of the United States 
to the Congress in the first place.”33 Donnell said, “That is precisely correct.” Malone replied, 
“To that extent, it is dangerous.” Donnell agreed: “To my mind, it is highly dangerous” 
because “the effect of a treaty may possibly be to vest in the Congress of the United States a 
vast reservoir of power to legislate on matters which perhaps previously had been confined to 
the States.”34 
The perceived danger did not stem from the Fujii decision itself. From Donnell’s 
perspective, the real danger lay in the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which meant that 
treaties ratified by the United States automatically invalidated conflicting state laws. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Missouri v. Holland was dangerous 
because it meant that the federal government could utilize the Treaty Power to extend 
Congress’ legislative powers into areas previously reserved to the States. Still, Fujii was a 
dramatic reminder that ratification of the Charter opened the door to legal arguments by 
aggrieved groups who sought to invalidate state laws that discriminated on the basis of “race, 
sex, language, or religion.”35 
While Senators discussed Fujii’s implications, the State was preparing its next move 
in the litigation. Two weeks after the Court of Appeal’s decision, the California Attorney 
General filed a petition for rehearing.36 Three days later, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and the American Jewish Congress (AJC) filed a joint amicus curiae brief opposing 
the petition for rehearing.37 They contended that the Court of Appeal’s decision was correct: 
the Alien Land Law was invalid because it conflicted with the Charter’s human rights 
provisions. A few days later, the Japanese American Citizens’ League and the NAACP filed 
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an application to join the ACLU/AJC brief, stating that the brief “is in accordance with the 
views of these petitioning amici curiae and petitioning amici curiae join therein.”38 Fujii was 
one of many cases during this period where groups that we now identify as “domestic civil 
rights” organizations invoked the Charter’s human rights provisions to support their preferred 
outcomes in domestic civil rights cases.39 The Court of Appeal denied the petition for 
rehearing on May 22, 1950.40 That decision effectively closed the first chapter of the Fujii 
litigation. By that time the battle lines were drawn. The ACLU, the NAACP and other civil 
rights organizations supported judicial application of the UN Charter to invalidate 
discriminatory state laws. Senate Republicans, state governments and others feared that 
judicial application of the Charter would disrupt the racial status quo in the Jim Crow South 
and upset the constitutional balance between the federal and state governments.  
The California Supreme Court issued its final decision in Fujii in April 1952.41 By 
that time it had become clear that, regardless of the merits of the Charter rationale, it was 
politically dangerous for courts to apply the Charter to invalidate state laws. Accordingly, the 
California Supreme Court repudiated the lower court’s Charter rationale, holding that the 
Charter’s human rights provisions are not self-executing.42 Fujii was the first published 
judicial decision in U.S. history that held a treaty to be non-self-executing in a case involving 
an alleged conflict between a treaty and state law. Before 1950, non-self-execution doctrine 
was a federal separation of powers doctrine that did not affect the relationship between 
treaties and state law. In contrast, the doctrine of treaty supremacy — a doctrine firmly rooted 
in the text of the Supremacy Clause — governed the relationship between treaties and state 
law. Fujii was influential because it effectively merged the doctrines of treaty supremacy and 
self-execution, which had previously been distinct doctrines.43 
Despite controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent upholding the validity of the Alien 
Land Law,44 the California Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.45 A leading critic of the decision observed:  
[T]hough in a technical legal sense the California Supreme Court holds the charter 
is not a self-executing treaty, the charter is allowed to produce the same effect by 
projecting itself into the thinking of the court in a new construction of the equal 
protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
the extent that earlier statutes and decisions of years' standing, even of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, are overruled by the Supreme Court of 
California upon the identical issue because of the influence of this international 
thinking.46 
 
In short, the California Supreme Court effectively incorporated the anti-discrimination norm 
from the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration into the Fourteenth Amendment. In this 
respect, the California Supreme Court decision in Fujii foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Brown two years later. In both cases, the decision to apply the Fourteenth 
Amendment, instead of applying the Charter, can be explained as a judicial response to the 
politics of human rights in the early 1950s. Part III addresses the politics of human rights. 
III. 
The Politics of Human Rights in the United States, Circa 1947-54 
 
During the period under review, the UN Commission on Human Rights provided a 
forum in which African Americans could air their grievances about racial discrimination 
before an international audience. In October 1947, the NAACP submitted a petition to the 
head of the UN Human Rights Division.47 The document presented “a searing indictment of 
America’s failure to practice what it preaches.”48 The NAACP petition became a subject of 
debate at the December 1947 meeting of the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.49 The Soviet delegate, wielding a copy of the 
petition, “exploited every opportunity to launch into a severe attack on U.S. discrimination 
practices.”50 Some U.S. newspapers “criticized the NAACP for furnishing Soviet Russia with 
new ammunition to use against us.”51 Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union routinely 
attacked racism in the United States as part of its propaganda campaign in the ideological 
battle between communism and capitalism. 
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Charges of aiding the Soviets did not tarnish the NAACP’s reputation significantly 
because it carefully avoided communist affiliations. However, the same could not be said of 
the Civil Rights Congress (CRC), a leading civil rights organization “on the attorney 
general’s list of subversive organizations.”52 In late 1951, the CRC released a petition to the 
United Nations entitled “We Charge Genocide.”53 William Patterson, the national secretary 
of the CRC, was the principal author. He acted “with encouragement and support from the 
Communist Party.”54 The petition accused the United States of committing genocide. 
Patterson “argued forcefully that Jim Crow was the result of a deliberate government policy 
to destroy African Americans.”55 The Commission on Human Rights would not accept the 
petition unless it came from a national government. Patterson recognized that the document 
“would lose its impact if it was seen as just another propaganda blast from the Soviet Union 
or its allies,”56 so he sought a government sponsor from outside the Soviet bloc. In January 
1952 he persuaded two “countries from outside the Soviet bloc . . . to place the Genocide 
petition on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights.”57 Given the CRC’s links to the 
Communist Party, the petition probably reinforced the growing belief among American 
conservatives that the UN’s human rights agenda was really “a Communist plan for 
destroying the American way of life.”58 That charge had significant political force at a time 
when McCarthy anti-communism was at its peak and the Cold War was in full swing. 
While civil rights groups petitioned the United Nations, they also invoked the Charter 
and Universal Declaration in domestic litigation. Professor Lockwood has identified fourteen 
Supreme Court cases between 1948 and 1955 in which one or more briefs invoked the 
Charter’s human rights provisions to support a civil rights claim.59 Shelley v. Kraemer is 
illustrative.60 Shelley involved a Missouri case and a Michigan case that were consolidated 
before the Supreme Court. African-Americans invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to 
challenge the validity of private contracts that precluded non-whites from buying homes in 
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residential neighborhoods. In both cases, state supreme courts upheld the racially restrictive 
covenants against equal protection challenges.61 Petitioners in both cases raised Charter 
arguments in briefs filed with the U.S. Supreme Court. Thurgood Marshall, the future 
Supreme Court Justice, represented petitioners in the Michigan case. He argued: “The human 
rights provisions of the United Nations Charter, as treaty provisions, are the supreme law of 
the land and no citizen may lawfully enter into a contract in subversion of their purposes. The 
restrictive agreement here presented for enforcement falls within this proscription.”62 
Moreover, he added: 
The attempt by the courts of the various states to aid private individuals in the 
prosecution of a course of action utterly destructive of the solemn treaty obligations 
of the United States must be struck down by this Court or America will stand before 
the world repudiating the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter 
and saying of them that they are meaningless platitudes for which we reject 
responsibility.63 
 
The United States filed an amicus brief supporting petitioners. The government’s brief added 
an international relations twist to Marshall’s legal argument. Specifically, the government 
argued that racially “restrictive covenants are entirely inconsistent with the future national 
and international welfare of the United States in its relations with the “non-white” peoples. . . 
. We will have better international relations when these reasons for suspicion and resentment 
have been removed.”64  
Shelley illustrates the close linkages between domestic civil rights groups and 
international human rights groups during the first decade after World War II. In Shelley, 
several domestic civil rights organizations filed amicus briefs invoking the Charter to support 
petitioners’ arguments.65 Meanwhile, leading international law experts intervened to support 
the petitioners. The American Association for the United Nations filed an amicus brief signed 
by several prominent international law experts, including Philip Jessup and Myres 
McDougal.66 The brief asserted: “Enforcement of racial restrictive covenants is a violation of 
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Article 55(c) and 56 of the treaty known as the United Nations Charter.” Additionally, it said, 
“the express language of the United States Constitution and . . . decisions of this Court . . . 
make the provisions of treaties binding in all law suits brought in any court in the United 
States.”67 
In sum, liberals thought the marriage of domestic civil rights and international human 
rights gave them a powerful tool to challenge racially discriminatory laws and practices. The 
executive branch supported civil rights reform, in part because U.S. diplomats warned that 
racial discrimination at home impeded accomplishment of U.S. foreign policy goals overseas. 
However, conservatives feared the unholy trinity of domestic civil rights litigation, 
inflammatory petitions to the United Nations accusing the United States of genocide, and 
continued work in the Commission on Human Rights to draft a legally binding Covenant on 
Human Rights. So conservatives launched a counter-attack. 
Frank Holman, a practicing lawyer from the State of Washington, led the conservative 
charge.68 Holman was President of the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1948-49. In an 
article in the ABA Journal, Holman warned of the danger posed by human rights treaties. The 
perceived danger stemmed from both the Genocide Convention,69 which the UN adopted in 
1948, and the Covenant on Human Rights, which was then in draft form. In Holman’s view, 
the treaty power was “being used to destroy or modify the rights of the states and the rights of 
American citizens.”70 He feared that human rights treaties would “increase the powers of the 
Federal Government at the expense of the states,” thereby changing “our form of government 
from a republic to a socialistic and completely centralized state.”71 He claimed that 
international human rights advocates sought “to level out our basic rights to a common 
denominator with rights as understood by fifty-seven other nations, [so] that such precious 
rights as jury trial and the writ of habeas corpus may . . . have to yield to the so-called 
common denominator of the other nations.”72 Holman commented specifically on Fujii: “The 
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Fujii decision means that our right to self-government, both state and national, and our right 
to determine for ourselves what kind of laws we want to live under, can be nullified 
whenever the President and two-thirds of the members of the Senate . . . approve a treaty on a 
particular subject.”73 Finally, he added, “It may be that a full and impartial study of the 
disturbing implications and legal effects of Article VI of our Constitution will indicate the 
necessity of a constitutional amendment”74 to prevent treaties from being used to alter 
domestic law. 
Holman used his influence in the ABA to advance his policy agenda. In addition to 
serving as ABA President, he was also a member of the influential ABA Special Committee 
on Peace and Law Through United Nations.75 In 1949, that Committee suggested that the 
“threat posed by human rights treaties” could potentially be averted “through amendment of 
the Constitution.”76 Then, in September 1950, the ABA House of Delegates passed a 
resolution “calling for a study to propose a constitutional amendment protecting the Bill of 
Rights and states’ rights from any treaty infringement.”77 Thus, the nation’s leading bar 
association endorsed the possibility of amending the Constitution to avert the perceived threat 
posed by human rights treaties.  
While Holman rallied support within the ABA for a constitutional amendment, 
Senator John Bricker, a Republican from Ohio, pursued a similar agenda in the Senate. In 
September 1951, Bricker introduced a bill with the text of a proposed constitutional 
amendment.78 He introduced a revised version of his proposed amendment in February 
1952.79 Later that month, the ABA House of Delegates approved its own version of a 
constitutional amendment.80 Different versions of the amendment emphasized different 
details, but all were designed to respond to the perceived threat posed by human rights 
treaties. In April 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles helped counter support for the 
Bricker Amendment by testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the United 
16 
 
States did not “intend to become a party to any such covenant [on human rights] or present it 
as a treaty for consideration by the Senate.”81 Despite Dulles’ pledge and despite firm 
resistance from the Eisenhower Administration, the Senate voted 60-31 in favor of one 
version of the Bricker Amendment in February 1954.82 That was one vote short of the 
requisite two-thirds majority, but it was sufficiently close to convince any remaining doubters 
that Bricker’s supporters constituted a potent political force. 
IV. 
Brown and Bolling 
 
The Supreme Court issued its landmark decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and 
Bolling v. Sharpe in May 1954.83 Brown involved four consolidated cases from Kansas, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. Plaintiffs alleged that racially segregated public 
schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Bolling was a single case challenging racially 
segregated public schools in the District of Columbia. Petitioners raised arguments based on 
the Fifth Amendment and the UN Charter.84 The Court heard oral argument in the school 
segregation cases in December 1952; it then requested additional argument and deferred final 
decision until the following term. Ultimately, the Court held that racial segregation in state-
run schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment and racial segregation in D.C. schools 
violated the Fifth Amendment. The UN Charter argument featured prominently in the parties’ 
briefs in Bolling,85 but the Court’s decisions did not mention the Charter.  
Several scholars have analyzed the socio-legal context to explain the Court’s 
decisions.86 Part IV asks why the Court relied on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
not the Charter, to support its conclusions. The first section analyzes the legal issues in 
Brown and Bolling, examining arguments based on the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the UN Charter. The analysis shows that the Charter-based argument for 
desegregation was legally sound: perhaps stronger than the constitutional arguments. The 
17 
 
next section considers extra-legal factors that may have induced the Court to disregard the 
Charter and base its decision on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
 
A. The Merits of Arguments Based on the Charter and the Constitution 
As of 1952-54, if one viewed the issue from a narrow, legalistic perspective, the 
argument that racially segregated public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment was 
fairly weak. When the Justices met privately to discuss the school segregation cases in 
December 1952, Justice Robert Jackson assessed the arguments as follows: “There is nothing 
in the text that says this is unconstitutional. There is nothing in the opinions of the courts that 
says it’s unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of the 14th amendment says it’s 
unconstitutional. On the basis of precedent I would have to say segregation is ok.”87  
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may not “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”88 Plaintiffs in Brown argued that racially 
segregated public schools were inherently unequal. Therefore, States that maintained such 
schools denied black children the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.89 As a litigation tactic, the NAACP decided to argue that segregation itself was 
unconstitutional, even if the State provided physically comparable facilities for white and 
black children.90 That approach forced the Court to address the constitutionality of 
segregation per se. In 1866, the same Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment 
enacted legislation “providing for separate schooling for the white and colored children in the 
District of Columbia.”91 Hence, the historical evidence demonstrated persuasively that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters did not believe that racially segregated schools were per se 
unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court held in Plessy v. Ferguson92 and subsequent cases that 
racial segregation was permissible, provided that the separate facilities were substantially 
18 
 
equal. Additionally, Justice Harlan, the sole dissenter in Plessy, believed that segregated 
schools were permissible.93 Thus, although the Fourteenth Amendment could be construed to 
prohibit racial segregation, the Court’s precedents and the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment weighed heavily against that interpretation. Accordingly, Justice 
Jackson “ridiculed the NAACP’s brief as sociology, not law.”94 
The Fifth Amendment argument for desegregation of D.C. public schools was even 
weaker. The text provides only that people shall not “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”95 The Fifth Amendment says nothing about equality or racial 
discrimination. Moreover, the Amendment took effect in 1791, when the Constitution treated 
slaves as property. Hence, the drafters of the Fifth Amendment clearly did not intend to 
guarantee black children a right to attend racially integrated schools. Although Plessy did not 
technically control the Fifth Amendment because Plessy was a Fourteenth Amendment case, 
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts had relied on Plessy to uphold racial 
segregation in the District of Columbia.96 Thus, text, precedent and original understanding all 
weighed against petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claim in Bolling.  
When the Justices met initially to discuss the segregation cases in December 1952, 
they did not follow their usual practice of voting on the cases. However, scholars have 
reconstructed their likely positions based on available conference notes. Justices Black, 
Douglas, Burton, and Minton clearly supported a holding that racial segregation in public 
schools is per se unconstitutional.97 Justice Frankfurter was prepared to invalidate racial 
segregation in D.C. public schools, but he found the state cases more troubling, in part 
because the problem of crafting an appropriate remedy was more difficult.98 Justice Reed 
spoke in favor of affirming Plessy, and Chief Justice Vinson was probably inclined to agree 
with him. Justices Jackson and Clark were apparently undecided.99 Ultimately, the Court 
ordered re-argument for the following term. Despite the prominence of the Charter argument 
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in the Bolling briefs, the available records suggest that the Justices did not discuss the Charter 
rationale as an alternative to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rationales. 
In contrast to the constitutional arguments, the Charter-based argument for 
invalidating racial segregation was fairly strong. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter obligate 
the United States to take “separate action” to promote “universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race.”100 Whereas 
the Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, focuses on “equal protection,” the Charter expresses 
a particularized rule condemning race-based distinctions. Therefore, even if the Plessy 
doctrine of “separate but equal” is a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Plessy is not a textually plausible interpretation of the Charter. That is no accident. States 
drafted the Charter’s human rights provisions against the historical background of race-based 
classifications in Nazi Germany. Representatives of several civil rights groups served as 
advisors to the U.S. delegation in San Francisco when the Charter was drafted; they lobbied 
hard to add strong human rights language to the Charter.101 Moreover, delegates from several 
non-European countries supported inclusion of robust human rights provisions in the Charter. 
Those who favored strong human rights provisions agreed that racial segregation deserved 
condemnation.  
The major powers were not enthusiastic about including human rights language in the 
Charter. John Foster Dulles, a member of the U.S. delegation and future Secretary of State, 
devised a compromise solution. The United States would accept “an unequivocal statement 
guaranteeing freedom from discrimination on account of race, language, religion, or sex,” but 
would insist on inserting a “domestic jurisdiction clause” in article 2.102 That clause said: 
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”103 The major 
powers were satisfied with this solution because the domestic jurisdiction clause prevented 
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the United Nations from adopting coercive measures to compel States to abolish 
discriminatory laws and practices.  
However, the domestic jurisdiction clause did not limit the scope of States’ 
obligations under Articles 55 and 56 to promote human rights “for all without distinction as 
to race.” Clearly, Articles 55 and 56 did not obligate the United States to abolish all forms of 
racial segregation immediately. However, the Charter did obligate the United States to take 
concrete steps to promote human rights “for all without distinction as to race.”104 Thus, the 
petitioners in Bolling could argue persuasively that a judicial decision perpetuating racial 
segregation in public schools would have been inconsistent with that treaty obligation.105 
Respondents’ primary counter-argument emphasized that the Charter itself did not specify 
which “human rights and fundamental freedoms” required protection.106 Even so, it would 
not have required a huge leap for the Court to hold that the right to education was one of the 
rights encompassed within the phrase “human rights and fundamental freedoms” in article 55 
of the Charter. 
If the Court based its holdings in Brown and Bolling on the Charter, it could have 
ruled against the school districts without overruling any of its own precedents, thereby 
avoiding the Plessy problem. The Court could have cited the concurring opinions in Oyama v. 
California as authority for judicial application of the Charter.107 Such a holding would have 
been inconsistent with the California Supreme Court decision in Fujii, but that decision had 
limited precedential force. As of 1954, no other state or federal court had followed the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Fujii; it was an isolated precedent. Additionally, Fujii 
was a dramatic departure from 150 years of consistent legislative, executive and judicial 
practice supporting application of the Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule without any 
exception for non-self-executing treaties.108  
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In sum, a holding that racially segregated public schools violated the UN Charter 
would have been legally defensible on the basis of treaty text, legal precedent, and the 
original understanding of the diplomats who drafted the Charter. (In contrast, the Senators 
who consented to treaty ratification clearly did not believe they were voting to abolish racial 
segregation in the United States.) Even so, the Court’s opinions in Brown and Bolling did not 
mention the Charter, and there is no evidence that the Justices discussed the Charter argument 
explicitly in their internal deliberations. Hence, the question arises, why did the Court 
disregard the Charter and focus exclusively on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? To 
answer that question, we must consider extra-legal factors. 
B. Extra-Legal Factors in Brown and Bolling 
The Court’s decision to rest its judgments on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
instead of the Charter, was driven by a combination of foreign policy, domestic politics, and 
psychological factors. Two briefs emphasized the foreign policy aspects of segregation. The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and five other non-governmental organizations filed 
a joint amicus brief in Brown that said: 
The United States is now engaged in an ideological world conflict in which 
the practices of our democracy are the subject of close scrutiny abroad. . . . We 
know that our enemies seize eagerly upon the weaknesses of our democracy 
and, for propaganda purposes, magnify, exaggerate and distort happenings in 
the United States. . . . Our discriminatory practices in education, in 
employment, in housing, have all been the subject of much adverse press 
comment in those foreign countries which we are trying to keep in the 
democratic camp.109 
 
The brief quoted a series of newspaper articles from France, Austria, Germany, and Belgium 
that were highly critical of American racism. It concluded that “legally imposed segregation 
in our country, in any shape, manner or form, weakens our program to build and strengthen 
world democracy and combat totalitarianism.”110 
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Shortly after Eisenhower’s election, the lame-duck Truman Administration filed a 
single amicus brief for all five segregation cases.111 The brief highlighted the special 
problems posed by racial discrimination in the District of Columbia. 
This city is the window through which the world looks into our house. The 
embassies, legations, and representatives of all nations are here, at the seat of 
the Federal Government. Foreign officials and visitors naturally judge this 
country and our people by their experiences and observations in the nation’s 
capital . . . . The shamefulness and absurdity of Washington’s treatment of 
Negro Americans is highlighted by the presence of many dark-skinned foreign 
visitors. Capital custom not only humiliates colored citizens, but is a source of 
considerable embarrassment to these visitors. Foreign officials are often 
mistaken for American Negroes and refused food, lodging and 
entertainment.112 
 
Although the government emphasized the unique problems caused by racial 
discrimination in the nation’s capital, it also placed those concerns in a global context. 
It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny 
that the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed. The United States is 
trying to prove to the people of the world, of every nationality, race, and color, 
that a free democracy is the most civilized and most secure form of 
government yet devised by man. We must set an example for others by 
showing firm determination to remove existing flaws in our democracy. . . . 
The continuance of racial discrimination in the United States remains a source 
of constant embarrassment to this Government in the day-to-day conduct of its 
foreign relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral 
leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world.113 
 
The message was not lost on the Justices: nothing less than the United States’ leadership of 
the free world was at stake. Justices Burton and Minton, in particular, were probably swayed 
by “the Cold War imperative for racial change.”114 The Cold War imperative helps explain 
why the Justices voted to end racial segregation in public schools, but it does not explain why 
they based their decision on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, a decision based 
on the UN Charter might have conveyed a stronger message to the world that the United 
States was truly committed to the international norm prohibiting racial discrimination. 
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Two distinct domestic political factors may have helped persuade the Justices to base 
their decisions on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than the Charter. First, the 
Bricker Amendment controversy reached its peak intensity in the Senate between February 
1953 and February 1954. The Supreme Court’s deliberations in Brown and Bolling lasted 
from December 1952 to May 1954. Thus, the Court was weighing its options at a time when 
the Bricker Amendment controversy was headline news in Washington. The Justices surely 
recognized that a holding based on the Charter might have tipped the political scales in favor 
of the Amendment. Even if individual Justices were personally supportive of Bricker’s 
agenda, the Court as a whole was probably reluctant to issue a decision that fanned the flames 
of a movement for a constitutional amendment. 
The second domestic political factor relates to remedies. The Justices were deeply 
concerned that a judicial order mandating desegregation would face massive resistance in the 
Deep South. Governor Byrnes of South Carolina had threatened to abolish public schools if 
the Court ordered desegregation.115 Justice Frankfurter, in particular, invoked concerns about 
the sensitivity of remedial issues as the main reason for the Court to hold the case over for an 
additional term.116 Given the Court’s fears about potential resistance to an order based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the prospect of ordering States to desegregate schools to achieve 
compliance with the Charter was virtually unthinkable. Such an order would have created a 
powerful coalition between white supremacists in the South and anti-UN forces in the ABA 
and the Senate, who were already concerned about UN intervention in matters of national 
sovereignty.117 As it happened, the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment decision in Brown 
contributed to substantial political turmoil in the South;118 the level of domestic political 
unrest might have been far worse if the Court relied on the Charter as a legal hook to support 
a desegregation order.  
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The preceding analysis might be construed to imply that the Justices consciously 
weighed the costs and benefits of judicial reliance on the Charter versus the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. However, the available evidence suggests that they did not 
seriously consider the Charter argument.119 Why not? The parties devoted a substantial 
portion of their briefs in Bolling to the Charter issue, so one cannot blame the parties for 
failing to raise it. As explained above, the Charter argument was arguably as strong on the 
merits as the constitutional arguments, so the Court could not dismiss the Charter argument 
as frivolous.  
Perhaps the best explanation is psychological. Professors Goodman and Jinks contend 
that human behavior can sometimes be explained as an attempt “to avoid the unpleasant state 
of cognitive dissonance between what [people] profess in public and what they believe in 
private.”120 The Charter argument in Bolling created severe cognitive dissonance for the 
Justices. They believed privately in American exceptionalism — the belief that the United 
States has the best Constitution in the world. The Charter argument forced them to confront 
the unpleasant fact that the Constitution, as it had been previously interpreted, was seriously 
deficient, because it permitted a form of apartheid that violated international human rights 
norms embodied in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration. A judicial decision based 
on the Charter would have implicitly acknowledged that deficiency. As Professor Charles 
Fairman wrote, “It would seem, indeed, a reproach to our constitutional system to confess 
that the values it establishes fall below any requirement of the Charter. One should think very 
seriously before admitting such a deficiency.”121 The Justices were not psychologically 
prepared to admit such a deficiency because that admission would have been inconsistent 
with their faith in American exceptionalism. Hence, one could infer that the Justices applied 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and not the Charter, “to avoid the unpleasant state of 
cognitive dissonance between what they profess in public and what they believe in 
25 
 
private.”122 By reinterpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to incorporate the 
international norm prohibiting racial segregation, the Justices could reconcile their public 





Although the Court did not mention the UN Charter in its published opinions in 
Brown and Bolling, the anti-discrimination norm codified in the Charter and the Universal 
Declaration probably influenced the Court’s decisions in at least three ways. First, the birth of 
modern international human rights law after World War II provided a powerful source of 
inspiration for civil rights activists in the United States between 1945 and 1954. The political 
synergy between human rights and civil rights helped embolden the plaintiffs in Brown and 
Bolling to confront segregation directly, rather than seeking half-measures. Second, the 
advent of human rights law altered the conduct of international diplomacy, transforming 
racial segregation in the United States from a purely domestic issue to a foreign policy issue. 
The foreign policy implications of racial segregation helped persuade the Justices to depart 
from established precedent and overrule Plessy. Third, the stark contrast between the new 
international anti-discrimination norm and the entrenched practice of racial segregation in the 
United States created severe cognitive dissonance for the Justices. They responded to the 
cognitive dissonance problem by reinterpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
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